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Abstract
This paper examines the extent of spillovers from US investor sentiment on G7
aggregate market, value and growth stock returns. As a proxy for investor senti-
ment, we include individual investor survey, measured by the University of Michigan
consumer confidence index and market sentiment measured by Baker and Wurgler’s
(2006) composite sentiment index. Using monthly data for the period January 1991
to December 2013, our results indicate the presence of significant spillover effects of
US investor sentiment on G7 stock returns. Our findings from generalized impulse
response functions show that aggregate market and growth stocks of all non US G7
countries are significantly affected by the propagation of the US market sentiment.
The financial crisis of 2007 has played a significant role in affecting value stock returns
in these countries. Our findings further reveal that both the rational and irrational
component of the US individual investor sentiment do not play any significant role
in affecting international stock returns.
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1 Introduction
Traditional tests of market efficiency have relied heavily on asset pricing models, in partic-
ular capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The CAPM states that both rational investors
and professional arbitrageurs play a significant role in minimizing security mispricing and
therefore asset prices will always reflect their true fundamental values. Furthermore, CAPM
does not place any role for behavioural factors (e.g. investor sentiment) in explaining as-
set prices. However, the EMH is put through renewed analysis following financial crises;
e.g. October 1987 stock market crash (French (1988)) and the recent financial crisis (Ball
(2009)). Several studies have attributed pricing anomalies to non-fundamental variables.
For instance, Black (1986) and De Long et al. (1990) have shown that investors trade on
noise rather than fundamentals. Furthermore, the presence of investors’ under-reaction and
overreaction resulting in securities mispricing is given as an explanation for pricing anoma-
lies (e.g. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998)).1
Recently, Brown and Cliff (2005) highlight the role of uninformed demand shocks and limits
to arbitrage as a potential explanation for security mispricing. Baker and Wurgler (2006)
show that stocks that have subjective valuations and are difficult to arbitrage are mostly
affected by investor sentiment. They find that these stocks usually tend to be small, young,
highly volatile, unprofitable, non-dividend paying, extreme growth and distressed stocks.
The vast majority of empirical studies have examined time-series relationships between
investor sentiment and stock returns. These studies were mainly centred around the US
market. To our knowledge, very few studies have determined the extent of the propagation
of US investor sentiment on international stock returns. As previous studies have shown
that any movement in the US stock market has a significant effect on international stock
markets (e.g. Masih and Masih (2001)), we expect US investor sentiment to play a sig-
nificant role in affecting international stock returns. In this study, we examine the extent
of spillover effects from US investor sentiment to non US G7 (G6, henceforth) aggregate
market returns as well as value and growth stock returns.2 The dynamic linkages between
US investor sentiment and G6 stock market returns is investigated, and in doing so, it
essentially asks two questions. First, to what extent do changes in the US sentiment levels
affect G6 stock returns; and second, should global investors be sensitive to changes in US
investor sentiment when considering non US G7 diversification potentials.
1The behavioural finance lexicon in the popular press has also expanded quite considerably in recent
years, with terms such as confidence, optimism and irrational exuberance all becoming regular behavioural
references to market movements. Alan Greenspan first used the term ‘irrational exuberance’ at a black tie
meeting in Washington D.C. in December 1996 to describe the behavior of stock market investors. The
immediate follow up televised speech rattled the world stock market by an average of 3% (Robert Shiller
(2005)).
2We use ‘G6’ and ‘non US G7’ term interchangeably throughout this paper.
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Is it still the case that when the US gets a cold, the rest of the world gets pneumonia?
On the one hand there has been a considerable increase in the degree of global integration,
measured in terms of trade. This is clearly depicted in figure 1 which represents an increase
in trade integration by over 84% in last 23 years. Furthermore, the role US plays in global
markets, as evidenced from its contribution to world GDP, also affirms the need for studying
the shocks originating from the US and its effect on other countries (see table 1). However,
the US contribution to world GDP has considerably declined over the last decade (see figure
2). Previous studies have already shown the significant role US sentiment plays in affecting
domestic US returns (e.g. Brown and Cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007)). Our
study examines the significance of shocks from the US sentiment on global financial markets
of non US G7 countries. As a proxy for investor sentiment, we include both direct and
indirect measures of US sentiment. Specifically, our direct measure is individual investor
survey, measured by the University of Michigan consumer confidence (UMCC), while the
indirect measure adopted is the Baker and Wurgler (2006) (BW henceforth) composite
sentiment index. We study their impact on aggregate market, value and growth stock
returns of G6 countries.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following areas. This is the first
study that investigates the presence of spillover effects of US investor sentiment on inter-
national aggregate market, value and growth stock returns. To our knowledge, only Verma
and Soydemir (2006) have examined the international effects of US investor sentiment on
aggregate stock returns. Verma and Soydemir (2006) include two developed economies,
the US and the UK, and three developing South American economies, Brazil, Mexico and
Chile. Our sample includes aggregate, value and growth stock returns of G6 countries, as
they represent equity markets that are highly developed, regulated and institutionalised.
Empirical evidence indicates that if stock markets across the globe are highly integrated,
then their performance should be driven by similar factors.3 As our study includes stock
returns of G6 countries whose stock markets are considered to be highly developed, then
the effect of the US sentiment on international stock returns should be pronounced.
Second, we include two measures of the US investor sentiment, a direct and an indi-
rect, to determine their effect on international stock returns. Besides individual investor
sentiment, measured by the UMCC index, we also examine the effect of the US market senti-
ment, measured by BW sentiment index, on G6 stock returns. Verma and Soydemir (2006)
examine the influence of individual investors’ sentiment index measured by the Ameri-
can Association of Individual Investors (AAII) and institutional investors’ sentiment index
measured by the Intelligence Investors (II) on stock returns of South American economies.
3Campbell and Hamao (1992) and Ferson and Harvey (1993) highlight the significance of global risk
factors in predicting national stock market returns as well as explaining their cross-sectional differences.
For instance, Campbell and Hamao (1992) show that the US dividend-price ratio or treasury bill rate not
only predict the stock returns of the US market but also of Japanese stock market.
2
However, Fisher and Statman (2000) show that the level of II sentiment index does not
have any significant effect on future S&P equity returns. As a result this raises doubt as to
whether II index can be considered an effective measure of investor sentiment.4 Further-
more, AAII sentiment index is constructed after seeking responses from consumers about
their behaviour (e.g. bullish, bearish or neutral); however the UMCC index is calculated
from survey responses by consumer households.5 The UMCC index has been included as
a measure of individual investor sentiment in many studies because of its longer time se-
ries. Although the survey sample size is small, and given that greater number of questions
are based on expectations component, its role in affecting the US stock returns has been
established by previous studies (e.g. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Schmeling (2009)
and Bathia and Bredin (2013)). The BW composite sentiment index was constructed by
Baker and Wurgler (2006) and is considered as an indirect measure of investor sentiment
as it is derived from six different variables representing investor sentiment.6
Third, we are motivated to explore the extent of rational (fundamental) and irrational
(noise) components of the US sentiment effect on international stock returns. ‘Rational
sentiment is that component of sentiment that is warranted by fundamentals, whereas the
unexplained component of sentiment that is unwarranted by fundamentals is referred as
an ‘irrational sentiment. The rational and irrational sentiment could be easily interpreted
in a way they are constructed. For instance, the BW composite sentiment index could
be considered as an ‘irrational sentiment’ as it is derived after stripping the net effect of
fundamentals on raw sentiment proxies (see footnote 6 for the explanation of BW composite
sentiment index methodology). Previous studies, including Lee et al. (2002) and Brown and
Cliff (2004), have mainly construed investor sentiment as irrational. Delong et al. (1990)
highlight that irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs affect stock prices
and earn higher expected returns. Campbell and Kyle (1993) highlight that stock prices
are influenced by the interaction between ‘noise’ (irrational) traders and ‘smart money’
(rational) investors. However, studies have also shown that investor sentiment partially
contain rational expectations based risk factors (e.g. Shliefer and Summers (1990), Brown
and Cliff (2005)).7 We decompose investor sentiment into a rational and an irrational
4Also see Solt and Statman(1988) and Clarke and Statman (1998) who observe similar findings.
5The University of Michigan conducts a monthly telephone interviews and asks them about their present
and future financial situations, their business and economic outlook over the next one to five years, and
also about their willingness to spend on durable goods in the near future. Of the total five questions asked,
three questions are based on expectations component. The samples include a minimum of 500 American
households, excluding those in Alaska and Hawaii. The survey methodology can be accessed from the
following web link: https://data.sca.isr.umich.edu/fetchdoc.php?docid=24774
6Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct their sentiment index using six sentiment variables, viz. closed-
end fund discount (CEFD), initial public offering (IPO) first day returns, IPO volume, dividend premium,
NYSE share turnover and the equity shares in new issues. They adopt first principal component analysis
in their sentiment index construction.
7Verma and Soydemir (2006) have examined the significance of both rational and irrational component
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component by controlling for any information that sentiment may contain about rational
factors.
Fourth, previous studies have shown that the US continues to be a dominating player
in global markets. These studies have shown that various shocks originating in the US
continues to affect global equity markets. For instance, the role of the US macro-economic
news announcements (e,g Becker et al. (1995), election cycles (e.g. Foerester and Schmitz
(1997), GDP (e.g. Dees and Guilhem (2011)), monetary policy (e.g. Canova (2005), Mack-
owiak (2007)), volatility (e.g. Ng (2000), Jiang et al. (2012)) have all found evidence of
international spillover effects. Given the dominant role the US plays in affecting world
equity market as evidenced from the above spillover studies, we therefore attempt to deter-
mine whether sentiment of US investors plays any significant role in transmitting its shocks
to international financial markets.
Fifth, we examine the extent of the value-growth relationship for G6 countries. Previous
studies have mainly explored time-series or cross-sectional relationships between investor
sentiment and value and growth stock returns. (e.g. Schmeling (2009), Lemmon and Port-
niaguina (2006)).8 As previous studies (e.g. Bird and Casavecchia (2007)) have shown
that price momentum, measure of market sentiment, is useful in timing the acquisition of
value and growth stocks, we believe our findings will be helpful to investors who can con-
sider either rational or irrational component of sentiment while devising their international
investment strategies.9 10
Our results from the generalized impulse response functions show that aggregate market
and growth stock returns of all G6 countries are significantly affected by the propagation
of US market sentiment, measured by the BW composite sentiment index. The financial
crisis of 2007 played a significant role in also affecting value stock returns, as we find
that value stocks were immune from sentiment shocks during the pre-crisis period. Our
findings further reveal that both the rational and irrational component of the US individual
investor sentiment do not play any role in affecting stock returns of G6 countries. The rest
of paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss relevant literature followed by
the discussion of econometric methodology adopted in section 3. Section 4 gives details on
the data adopted and descriptive statistics. In section 5, we discuss our empirical findings.
of investor sentiment on international stock returns.
8Schmeling (2009) examine the effect of consumer confidence index of 18 industrialized countries on its
respective stock returns and find that value stocks are mainly affected by investor sentiment. By allowing
conditional market beta to be a function of consumer confidence index, Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006),
find that value stocks respond significantly to changes in consumer confidence index.
9Also see Barberis and Shleifer (2003) who highlight that investors’ group all assets into different styles
(e.g. large-cap stocks, growth stocks, US government bonds, etc) and later allocate funds to these styles
rather than to an individual security, thus pursuing style investing.
10We also determine the significance of US investor sentiment on sector returns of UK, Canada and
Japan.
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And finally we conclude the paper in section 6.
2 Literature Review
As discussed before, we study the propagation of the US individual investor sentiment
and market sentiment on G6 aggregate market returns as well as value and growth stock
returns. Given that many practitioners and traders who follow news and then trade on
prevailing sentiment levels in the economy, it therefore becomes necessary to define what
investor sentiment is. According to Brown and Cliff (2004), “investor sentiment represents
the expectations of market participants relative to a norm: a bullish (bearish) investor
expects returns to be above (below) average, whatever average may be” (page 2). As a
proxy for individual investor sentiment, we include the monthly levels of individual investor
survey; and also study the significance of the BW composite sentiment index as a proxy
for market sentiment.
2.1 The role of the US in global financial markets
The US has continued to play a dominant role in affecting global markets. This is high-
lighted by the number of studies that have examined the impact of shocks originating from
the US on international stock markets. A variety of shocks has been examined including
macro-economic news announcements, monetary policy, volatility, election cycles, and sen-
timent originating from the US. For instance, Tandon and Urich (1987) show the presence
of a significant relationship between US macroeconomic announcements and international
stock market returns. Becker et al. (1995) examine the time UK equities took to respond
to the US macroeconomic news and find that UK market responds immediately to US
macroeconomic news surprises rather than waiting for the US reaction to the US news.
Furthermore, the spillover effects of the shocks to the US monetary policy has been em-
pirically explored by many studies (e.g. Canova (2005), and Mackowiak (2007), Bredin et
al. (2010)). The role of the US election cycle has been examined by Foerster and Schmitz
(1997). They argue that the US election cycle may be an important non-diversifiable
political factor in the determination of international conditional expected stock returns.
Soydemir (2000) study the transmission patterns of stock market movements between US
and emerging market economies, and find that US stock market significantly affects emerg-
ing stock markets at varying degrees. Specifically, the author observe that significant links
exist between the stock markets of the US and Mexico and weaker links between the mar-
kets of the US, Argentina, and Brazil.11 Dees and Guilhem (2011) examine the spillover
11Also see Masih and Masih (2001) who show that the US plays dominant role in affecting world equity
markets.
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effect of the US gross domestic product (GDP) shocks to the rest of the world. They find
that the change in US GDP has a weaker but persistent impact on the non-US economies
in recent years.
The significance of the US stock market on international stock market returns has been
studied to determine the extent of stock market co-movement. The seminal work by King
and Wadhwani (1990) find the evidence supporting contagion hypothesis as they observe
that the return correlation between markets increases with the volatility in each stock
market. However, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test for contagion during three periods of
market turmoil: the 1997 East Asian crises, the 1994 Mexican peso collapse, and the 1987
U.S. stock market crash, and they did not find any evidence of contagion. They instead
argue that the high levels of co-movement across many stock markets during tumultuous
periods reflects a continuation of strong cross-market linkages, and not a significant shift
in these linkage.
The spillovers from volatility shocks from the US have also been studied extensively. For
instance, Liu and Pan (1997) find that the US market is more influential than the Japanese
market in transmitting returns and volatilities to the Asian markets. They further observe
that the spill-over effects are more unstable over time and increased substantially after the
October 1987 stock market crash. Ing (2000) examine the magnitude and changing nature
of volatility spillovers from Japan and the US to six Pacific-Basin equity markets, and
confirms the presence of significance spillovers. Furthermore, Jiang et al. (2012) examine
the effect of US and European news announcements on the spillover of volatility between
US and European markets and across European market. They find that the lagged changes
in the US volatility index (VIX) have a significant impact on all European volatility indices,
therefore, noting the presence of implied volatility transmission from the US to Europe.12.
The studies discussed above, nonetheless, argue that shocks originating from the US
economy play a significant role in affecting the world equity markets.
2.2 Significance of the US sentiment
Previous studies have shown that US sentiment plays a significant role in affecting domestic
returns. These studies have shown that so-called ‘sentiment’ measures play a significant
role in affecting security returns as well as overall market returns. Some of these measures
include closed-end fund discount (e.g. Zweig (1973), Lee et al. (1991)), fund flow (e.g.
Warther (1995), Frazzini and Lamont (2006)), put-call ratio (e.g. Easley et al. (1998), Pan
and Poteshman (2006)), dividend premium (e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007)), IPO
12Also see Connolly and Wang (1998) who examine the relation between news announcements and stock
market volatility spillovers for the US, UK and Japan. They find that news announcement affect the size
of intermarket return spillovers, and it also partially explains volatility spillovers among the three markets.
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first day returns (e.g. Ritter (2003), Ljungqvist (2006)). Of all the available sentiment
proxies, investors survey have been found to be more useful and consistent in forecasting
future stock returns. Investors survey are considered to be a direct measure of sentiment, as
it is a proxy which is constructed after conducting direct interviews with investors. Monthly
surveys are regularly conducted in most of the developed and developing countries with the
objective to determine the investors’ perception of current and future economic conditions
(e.g. employment, household income, etc). For instance, increase (decrease) in investors
confidence is usually considered bullish (bearish). In the US, different organisation, in-
cluding American Association of Individual Investors (AAII), Investors Intelligence (II),
University of Michigan Consumer Confidence Index Survey, the Conference Board, etc,
conduct weekly and monthly surveys of household consumers.
Previous studies on survey sentiment-return relationship for the US market have shown
positive (negative) association between investor confidence and concurrent (future) stock
returns. Most of these studies only focussed on analysing time-series relationship between
survey sentiment and domestic stock returns. For instance, Fisher and Statman (2000,
2003) show that an increase in the consumer confidence index results is associated with
contemporaneously higher returns and subsequent lower returns. Brown and Cliff (2005)
find that investor optimism is associated with low subsequent returns as valuation levels
return to intrinsic value. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) highlight that consumer confi-
dence index is useful in forecasting small-cap stock returns as well as returns of stocks with
low institutional ownership. They find that investors appear to over value small stocks
relative to large stocks during periods when consumer confidence is high and vice versa.
Similarly, Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that small, young, highly volatile, unprofitable,
non-dividend paying, extreme growth and distressed stocks are mainly affected by investor
sentiment and these stocks usually have subjective valuations and are also difficult to
arbitrage. The findings of survey sentiment-return relationship for the non-US market are
similar to the US studies. Schmeling (2009) finds a negative relationship between consumer
confidence index and future stock returns of 18 industrialised countries. The author further
highlights that the effect of sentiment is greater for countries where stock markets display
low market integrity, less institutionalised and where investors display herding behaviour.
The similar findings were noted by Bathia and Bredin (2013) who find negative relationship
between survey sentiment and future stock returns of G7 countries. They further find that
value stocks relative to growth stocks are significantly affected by investor sentiment. Finter
et al. (2010) investigate the sentiment-return relationship of German stock market and also
find similar results. Zouaoui et al. (2011) find the significance of consumer confidence index
in predicting the stock market crisis of 15 European countries and the US. They also show
that the impact of sentiment is more pronounced on the countries that are culturally prone
to a herd-like behaviour and less institutionalised. From the above, it is evident that
the US centred studies find that growth stocks are the main victim of investor sentiment,
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whereas cross-sectional studies focused on international economies highlight that value
stocks relative to growth stocks are mainly affected by investor sentiment.
2.3 Does the shock to US sentiment spillover?
As evidenced from the above studies, shocks from the US affects global financial markets,
and shocks from the US sentiment play a significant role in affecting US stock returns. Our
study, therefore, attempts to find whether spillovers from the US sentiment shocks affect
stock returns of non US G7 countries.13 As a proxy for individual investor sentiment, we
include the UMCC index. The significance of the UMCC index, as a measure of investor
sentiment, has been found by previous studies (e.g. Fisher and Statman (2003), Lemmon
and Portniaguina (2006), Bathia and Bredin (2013)).
Previous studies have shown that any shift in the level of investor sentiment can be
attributed as fully irrational where investors’ mainly trade on noise and not fundamentals
(e.g. Black (1986), De Long et al. (1990)) or combination of both rational and irrational
(e.g. Shliefer and Summers (1990), Campbell and Kyle (1993)).14 However, the extent
to which rational and irrational component of US investor sentiment affects international
stock returns have not been examined by many studies. And we therefore decompose the
UMCC index into rational and irrational sentiment. The methodology to decompose the
UMCC index in discussed in the next section.
As a proxy for market sentiment, we include the BW composite sentiment index, which
is an indirect measure of investor sentiment. Indirect measure of sentiment is derived by
observing any financial variable that reflects investors’ optimism and pessimism. Baker and
Wurgler (2006) construct sentiment index from the following sentiment proxies: closed-end
fund discount (CEFD), IPO first day returns, IPO volume, dividend premium, NYSE share
turnover and the equity shares in new issues. Before constructing a sentiment index, they
remove business cycle variation from each of these proxies, where they regress each raw sen-
timent variable on five macro-economic variables (change in consumer durables, consumer
non-durables, consumer services, dummy variable for NBER recession, and change in indus-
trial production) and use the residuals from the regression in the first principal component
analysis (PCA).15 This index is considered fully irrational as the index is constructed from
13However our study differs from Baker et al. (2012) who construct investor sentiment indices for six
major stock markets and decompose them into one global and six local indices. They find that both global
and local sentiment are contrarian predictors of the time-series of cross-sectional returns within markets.
Also see Bai (2014) who examines the case of sentiment and contagion for eight European stock markets.
14Also see Campbell and Kyle (1993) who highlight in their model that stock prices are influenced by
competitive interaction between ‘smart money’ (rational) investors and noise traders. Also see Brown and
Cliff (2005) who argue that investor sentiment contain both rational and irrational component. In doing
so, they include a set of control variables that capture the rational predictability.
15Also see Brown and Cliff (2004) who adopt a similar approach in extracting a sentiment factor from a
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orthogonalized proxies.
3 Methodology
3.1 Raw Sentiment Spillovers
An examination of the spillover effects of the US sentiment on international stock returns
can be expressed in the following equation:
Rjt = α0 + βik
3∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Sentit−k + βjk
6∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
Rjt−k + ζt (1)
where, Rjt represents either aggregate market returns, value stock returns or growth stock
returns of the jth stock market at time t, k denotes the appropriate lag length, α0 is
a constant, βik and βjk are the parameters to be estimated, Sentit−k represents the US
investor sentiment (where, i=1 represents individual rational sentiment, i=2 represents
individual irrational sentiments and i=3 represents BW composite sentiment index) and
ζt is a random error term. The variables representing individual rational sentiment and
individual irrational sentiment are discussed later below.
We adopt the vector autoregression (VAR) modelling econometric methodology of Sims
(1980) to investigate the propagation of the US sentiment on international aggregate mar-
ket returns as well as value stock and growth stock returns. The VAR model treat all the
observed variables as a priori endogenous. It contributes in explaining the current values
of a set of variables that could be partly explained by past values of the variables involved.
The VAR methodology has been implemented in several studies as it has shown its reliabil-
ity and consistency in capturing cross-country spill overs (e.g. Verma and Soydemir (2006),
Fornari and Stracca (2012), Fadejeva et al. (2013), Bai (2014)). This methodology, will
therefore, facilitate a detailed analysis of the role of US sentiment on international mar-
kets. Direct estimation of the formulated models will only give the relationships between
the anticipated components. The findings could be misleading if the effect of changes in
the unanticipated components and stock market returns is ignored. We, therefore, use gen-
eralised impulse response function (GIRF) of Pearson and Shin (1998) generated from the
VAR model to overcome such a potential misspecification problem. The GIRF is invariant
to the ordering of the VAR variables and considered a more reliable approach versus the or-
thoganalized approach where the ordering of the variable determines result outcome. GIRF
depicts the predicted pattern of surprise changes or innovations generated from running
the VAR model. Due to time delays in the generation and dissemination of information
set of noisy proxies.
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concerning both rational and irrational factors, the information generated from the stock
return variables may not always be contemporaneous. Furthermore, the delay in report-
ing of information may create lags between the different observation of data concerning
such variables. Therefore, it would be considered unrealistic if we were to only assume
the presence of contemporaneous relationships between the different variables measured at
time t.16 The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian information
criterion (SBIC) are adopted to identify appropriate lag lengths. The VAR model can be
expressed in the following form:
Z(t) = C +
12∑
i=1
A(s)Z(t−m) + εt (2)
where, Z(t) is a column vector of variables under consideration, C is the deterministic
component comprised of a constant, A(s) is a matrix of coefficients, m is the lag length,
and εt is a vector of random error terms.
We perform diagnostic tests to determine the reliability of our VAR model. We failed to
reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals for any of the ten
orders tested, therefore indicating that this test gives no hint of model misspecification.
Furthermore, the Jarque-Bera statistics does not even come close to rejecting the null
hypothesis that the disturbances in a VAR are normally distributed. The results of these
tests are available from the author upon request.
3.2 Rational and Irrational Sentiment
We decompose individual investor sentiment into both rational (fundamental) and irrational
(noise) components. As noted earlier, previous studies have mainly construed investor sen-
timent as fully irrational that reflects both investors’ optimism and pessimism. However,
a small number of studies have shown that investor sentiment also contains rational ex-
pectations based risk factors (e.g. Brown and Cliff (2005)). It is for this reason we think
it is necessary to determine the propagation of both rational and irrational component of
investor sentiment on international stock returns. We decompose individual investor sen-
timent, measured by the UMCC index, by controlling for any information sentiment may
16The importance of lag length determination is demonstrated in several studies. For instance, Lutkepohl
(1993) highlight that when a higher order lag length is chosen over the true lag length will cause an
increase in the mean-square forecast errors of the VAR and that underfitting the lag length will often
generate autocorrelated errors. Also see Braun and Mittnik (1993) who investigate the consequences of
model misspecifications in vector autoregressions (VARs). They show that estimates of a VAR whose lag
length differs from the true lag length are inconsistent as are the impulse response functions and variance
decompositions derived from the estimated VAR.
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contain about rational factors. The equation can be shown in the following form:
Isentt = γ0 + γi
12∑
i=1
fundit + ξt (3)
where, Isentt represents individual investor sentiment measured by the UMCC index, fundit
is the set of macro-economic variables representing rational expectations based on risk
factors that carry non-redundant information, γ0 is a constant and γi represents all the
parameters to be estimated for different set of macro-economic variables, and ξt is a random
error term.17
The fitted values of the above equation, Iˆsentt, will then represent rational component
and ξt will represent irrational component of individual investor sentiment. The approach
that we adopt is consistent with the methodologies applied in the literature. 18 We con-
sider the BW composite index that captures only the irrational component of the entire
stock market. As noted earlier, Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct composite sentiment
index after removing business cycle variations from six sentiment proxies. The resulting
equation after considering BW composite sentiment index and individual investor rational
and irrational sentiment in the return generating process can be expressed in the following
form:
Rjt = α0 + β1k
K∑
k=1
Iˆsent1t−k + β2k
K∑
k=1
ξt−k + β3k
K∑
k=1
Sent3t−k + βjk
6∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
Rjt−k + υt (4)
where , β1k, β2k, β3k are the parameters to be estimated of individual investors’ rational
sentiment (ˆIsent1t−k), individual investors’ irrational sentiment (ξt−k) and BW sentiment
index (Sent3t−k) respectively. υt represents a random error term. In order to decompose
investor survey sentiment into rational and irrational component, we include 12 macro-
economic variables (discussed in next section) to net out commonly employed risk factors.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
As discussed earlier, we are interested in determining the significance of the spillover ef-
fects of US sentiment on the G6 countries. For this reason, we employ aggregate market,
17The macro-economic variables have also been considered in sentiment-return relationship study by
Baker and Wurgler (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Schmeling (2009).
18For instance, Barro (1978) estimate a model using two-step procedure. The author obtains OLS
estimates of the forecasting equation and uses the residuals and fitted values as an independent variables
in an OLS estimation of the output equation. Also see Poitras (1997) who adopts the similar methodology.
Furthermore, Pagan (1984) notes that although two-step estimates are not efficient, they are certainly
consistent.
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value stock and growth stock returns in monthly intervals for the period January 1991 to
December 2013 from Kenneth French’s data library.19 This gives us about 240 monthly
observations. The measure of individual investor sentiment, the University of Michigan con-
sumer confidence index, is sourced from the University of Michigan website; whereas the
measure of market sentiment, Baker and Wurgler’s composite sentiment index, is sourced
from Jeffery Wurgler’s website.20
We include 12 macro-economic variables as independent variables in order to decompose
the UMCC index into rational and irrational component. In particular, we include monthly
changes in ‘consumer price index’ (inflation) (Sharpe (2002)); monthly change in ‘industrial
production index’ (Schwert (1990)); detrended ‘1 month Treasury Bill’ (T-Bill) (Campbell
(1991)); detrended ‘default spread’ which is measured as a difference in yield between
Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bonds (Fama and French (1989)); detrended ‘term
spread’ which is difference in yield of 10 year Treasury Bond and 3 month T-Bill (Fama
(1990)); detrended ‘economic risk premia’ which is measured as the term structure of
interest rates, the difference in monthly yield of 1 month and 3 month T-Bill (Ferson and
Harvey (1991)); ‘dividend yield’ Fama and French (1988); currency fluctuation which is
measured as monthly change in 26 country trade-weighted US dollar index (Elton and
Gruber (1991)); excess return on market portfolio (MRP) (Sharpe (1964)); the premium
on a portfolio of small stocks relative to large stocks (SMB) (Fama and French (1993));
the premium on a portfolio of high book to market stocks relative to low book to market
stocks (HML) (Fama and French (1993)); and momentum factor (UMD) (Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993)).21 The data on industrial production index, 1 month T-Bill, economic risk
premia, default spread, and term spread are sourced from the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, whereas data on consumer price index and currency fluctuation
are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Dividend yield data is taken
from the Center for Research for Security Prices (CRSP), while MRP, SMB, HML, and
UMD factors are sourced from Kenneth French data library.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the above variables plus value and growth
stock returns of the G7 countries for the period January 1991 to December 2013. From the
table, we see that value stocks on average have yielded higher returns than growth stocks
for all the countries. For instance, value stocks in Canada on average have yielded 1.20%
19Returns are sourced from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_
library.html Stock returns are from the value weighted portfolio including dividends in the US dol-
lar. The top 30% of stocks sorted by book-to-market ratio are considered as value stocks and the bottom
30% of stocks sorted by book-to-market ratio are considered as growth stocks.
20The UMCC index is sourced from http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/data-archive/mine.php and
BW composite sentiment index is sourced from http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/ As BW com-
posite sentiment index data is available until December 2010, our sample consists of data until that time.
21We consider detrending 1 month T-Bill, economic risk premia, term spread and default spread as we
found these series to display properties of stochastic non-stationarity.
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monthly returns whereas growth stocks have yielded 0.89%. The positive mean value of
the BW composite sentiment index of 0.09 tells us that investors were generally bullish for
over last two decades. Furthermore, given the minimum and maximum value of the UMCC
index (which is 55.30 and 112.00 respectively), the mean value of the UMCC index (86.30)
is found to be slightly close to the maximum value, therefore, indicating the presence of
bullish behaviour of individual investors. Before performing empirical analysis, we check
for the presence of a unit root in the series. We run augmented Dickey Fuller test for
each series (results reported in table 1, last column). The null hypothesis of a unit root is
rejected for each series as t-statistic is more negative than the critical values.22
5 Empirical Analysis
We decompose individual investor sentiment into a rational and irrational component by
running the OLS regression of the UMCC index on 12 macro-economic variables.23 The
results are reported in table 4 (Regression 1). We find that the UMCC index is signifi-
cantly related to 1 month T-Bill, economic risk premia, dividend yield and momentum.
The Lagrange multiplier test of Breusch and Godfrey (BG) suggests evidence of of serial
correlation in the residuals. The appropriate number of lags determined by the BG test
in order to remove autocorrelation were 19. Regression 2 presents updated coefficients for
all variables after inclusion of lags (see table 4). With lag inclusion, we observe significant
improvement in adjusted R2 from 28.61% to 92.54%.24
To determine the significance of spillover effects of US investor sentiment (individual
investors’ rational sentiment, individual investors’ irrational sentiment and BW composite
sentiment index) on G6 aggregate market, value stock and growth stock returns, we esti-
mate three separate nine-variable VAR models; aggregate market, value stocks and growth
stocks portfolios. A nine variable VAR model includes 6 stock returns variables (of non
US G7 countries), individual rational sentiment, individual irrational sentiment and BW
composite sentiment index. We determine the appropriate number of lags to be one for all
three VAR models after considering consistent and asymptotically efficient Akaike infor-
22The critical values of Dickey Fuller at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level is -3.464, -2.881 and -2.571
respectively.
23Before we perform our analysis, we also check for the presence of multicollinearity in our data by
examining cross-correlations amongst different macro-economic variables. The results of cross-correlations
of different macro-economic variables are reported in table 3. From the results it is evident that there is,
in fact, low correlation amongst different macro-economic variables (the lowest being -0.63 between term
spread and on month T-Bill, and the highest being 0.49 between one month T-Bill and economic risk
premia). Hence we confirm that the issue of multicollinearity does not exist in our data.
24The IRF plots from structaral VAR were also consistent with the GIRF. The reults are not reported
here for the sake of brevity. However they are available from the authors upon request.
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mation criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) as well as loss
in degrees of freedom. The AIC and SBIC values up to lag 6 are reported in table 5.
5.1 Significance of the BW composite sentiment index
We plot GIRF from the vector autoregression (VAR) estimation for 24 months.25 We find
that any shifts in the level of the BW composite sentiment index has a significant effect
on aggregate market and growth stocks of all G6 countries as well as value stocks of all
G6 countries except for Canada and France. For instance, a one standard deviation shock
in the BW composite sentiment index results in an increase in growth stock returns of
Canada by 3.33%. This effect increases in the second month and gradually declines in
the subsequent months. In the case of aggregate market returns, we find that the effect
is very much similar across all G6 countries. We find that the mean response for all G6
countries is positive and significant, and note that one unit of sentiment shock results in an
increase in overall market returns by an average of 2.77%. Interestingly, we observe that
the magnitude of the shock on value stock returns is slightly smaller relative to aggregate
market returns and growth stock returns (i.e. 2.35%), indicating that value stocks are
slightly less sensitive to sentiment shocks from the US.
In order to determine the implications of the financial crisis on our sentiment results,
we plot GIRF for both pre-criss and crisis period. We consider pre-crisis period from
January 1991 to December 2006 and crisis period from January 2007 to December 2013.26 27
Interestingly, we observe that the effect on value stocks is more pronounced during the crisis
period as we find mean responses to be insignificant (significant) for pre-crisis (crisis) period.
This observation is noted for all G6 countries. For instance, a one standard deviation
shock in the BW composite sentiment index depresses value stock returns of non US G7
countries by an average of 2.31%. Furthermore, we also find that both aggregate market
returns and growth stock returns are also affected by spillovers from the BW composite
sentiment index for both pre-crisis and crisis period. Our findings are in line with previous
studies on the US (e.g. Brown and Cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006)), where they
find that both aggregate market and growth stocks are significantly affected by the US
25The plots of mean response of G6 aggregate market, value and growth stock returns to a one standard
deviation shock in the BW composite sentiment index are not reported here for brevity sake. However
they are available from the authors upon request.
26The Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis note in their report, ‘Financial crisis: The timeline of events
and policy actions’, that in Ferbruary 2007 the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Freddie Mac,
announced that it will no longer buy the most risky subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities,
reflecting their suspicious behavior about bubble in the credit market. This report could be accessed from
the following weblink, http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline
27The GIRF plots for both pre-crisis and crisis period are not reported here for brevity sake. These plots
are avilable from the authors upon request.
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sentiment. For instance, Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that when sentiment is estimated
to be high, growth stocks that are attractive to optimists and speculators and at the same
time unattractive to arbitrageurs, because of their difficulty to price, tend to earn relatively
low subsequent returns. Brown and Cliff (2005) determine the significance of Investor’s
Intelligence survey data, and find that an increase in investor optimism is associated with
lower subsequent aggregate market returns. They further note that higher capitalization
growth stocks are the main victims of survey sentiment.
The inevitable role the BW composite sentiment index plays in affecting international
stock returns is determined in relation to trade ties that G6 countries enjoy with the US.
We implement this approach based on the findings of previous studies that have shown
that factors internal to the US results into global stock market co-movement. For instance,
Dornbusch et al. (2000) identify trade links, regional patterns, and macro-similarities to be
major determinants of the stock market co-movements. In table 6, we report trade shares
of non US G7 countries with the US. Interestingly, we observe that trade interdependencies
between non US G7 countries and the US has declined significantly over the last two
decades (1990’s and 2000’s). Furthermore, when we measure the change in non US G7
countries’ trade shares with the US for pre-crisis and crisis period, we observe that the
decline further increases. For instance, we observe that Japan’s trade dependence on the
US during pre-crisis and crisis period almost halved (i.e. 43.22%). However, that did not
let Japanese stocks to remain immune from the shocks of US sentiment. In fact, not only
aggregate market and growth stocks were affected during the crisis period, but value stocks
were also significantly affected by the US sentiment. Recall, that value stocks were immune
to shocks from the US sentiment during pre-crisis period.
The decline in trade dependence of G6 countries on the US reflects the fact that G6
economies have increased their trade engagement with other world countries excluding the
US. This is clearly evident in table 7, which reports non US G7 countries’ trade activity
relative to nominal GDP. The widening of trade with rest of the world excluding US is
observed for all non US G7 countries. This increase is observed in double digits when
measured for the last two decades (1990’s and 2000’s) as well as for pre-crisis and crisis
period. Furthermore, we also observe that the degree of trade integration of non US G7
countries with the US declined over the last two decades and also during pre-crisis and crisis
period. The degree of trade integration of non US G7 countries with the US is reported
in table 8. In all, it seems that despite the declining trade interdependence between G6
countries and US, shocks pertaining from the US sentiment continue to affect G6 stock
returns. Our results, therefore, affirm the findings of previous studies that have shown that
the US plays a dominant role in global markets; although this dominance has declined over
a period of last 23 years when measured in terms of GDP (see table 1).28
28Table 1 reports the change in G7 countries share of world GDP over the last two decades and for both
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However, the above findings clearly questions the fact whether trade linkages have any
role in affecting stock market co-movements as noted by previous studies (e.g. Dornbusch
et al. (2000)). Verma and Soydemir (2006) also noted that the effect of US sentiment
on international stock returns is dependent on the trade relationship that each country
enjoys with the US. Our findings are therefore not consistent with previous findings; and
we therefore note that shocks from the US sentiment play a significant role in affecting
international stock returns despite a decrease in trade interdependence. Our conclusion is
that, these spillovers are not necessarily linked to trade interdependence between non US
G7 countries and US. The persistent effect observed across all non US G7 countries could
be due to the dominant role the US plays in world economy. Furthermore, the declining
role of the US in global market, when measured in terms of the GDP, does not result in any
change in magnitude of shocks on stock returns of G6 countries over the last two decades.
The significance of the BW composite sentiment index in affecting non US G7 stock re-
turns could also be explained in the light of degree of capital markets integration. Previous
studies have found the evidence of capital markets integration amongst G7 countries (e.g.
Kasa (1992), Swanson (2003), Morelli (2009)). For instance, Kasa (1992) find the evidence
of single common risk factor driving the stock markets of the US, UK, Germany, Canada
and Japan. Swanson (2003) find the evidence supporting the hypothesis of capital market
integration of the US, Germany and Japan.29
Given the significance of the BW composite sentiment index, our findings, therefore,
suggest that the BW composite sentiment index could play as role of global risk factor and
its significance could be determined in international asset pricing models.
5.2 Significance of rational and irrational sentiment
We now proceed to discuss the responses of G6 aggregate market, value and growth stock
returns due to the propagation of US rational and irrational sentiments of individual in-
vestors, measured by the UMCC index.30 Interestingly, we find that rational sentiments of
the US individual investors generally do not play any role in affecting international stock
returns except for French growth stocks. Our analysis for pre-crisis and crisis period further
reveal that only French growth stocks were (affected) unaffected by the rational sentiments
during (crisis) pre-crisis period; whereas all other countries remain immune to shocks from
pre-crisis and crisis period.
29Also see Heston et al. (1995) who find that the rewards for risks are identical across US and twelve
European countries supporting the hypothesis of capital market integration.
30The plots of responses of stock returns to a unitary shock in rational and irrational sentiments are not
presented here for brevity sake. They are available from the authors upon request.
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rational sentiment spillovers.31 Our findings, therefore, cast doubt on the significance of
rational sentiment of the US individual investors; as previous studies have shown that ra-
tional sentiments play a significant role in affecting international stock returns (e.g. Verma
and Soydemir (2006)). Verma and Soydemir (2006) find that rational sentiment of US
individual investors, measured by AAII, significantly affects US and UK stock returns. We
attribute inconsistent findings for the UK market for the two separate time periods, as well
as the different measures of individual investor sentiment adopted in our study. In all, we
note that rational sentiment of US individual investors does not play any role in affecting
G6 stock returns; and therefore conclude that sentiment is not necessarily a manifestation
of the rational risk factors driving expected stock returns as shown by previous studies (e.g.
Verma and Soydemir (2006)).32
Furthermore, we find that the irrational component of individual investor sentiment
does not play any role in affecting G6 stock returns. The results remain the same for both
pre-crisis and crisis period, as we find insignificant mean responses for all G6 countries. This
finding is consistent with previous studies (see Verma and Soydemir (2006)). However, our
findings differ from previous studies on the US and non US countries that have examined
sentiment-return relationship using either time-series data or cross-sectional data. These
studies have construed sentiment as fully irrational (e.g. Brown and Cliff (2004)). For
instance, previous studies using US data have shown that large capitalized growth stocks
are being significantly affected by the US individual investor sentiment (e.g Brown and Cliff
(2004)). Furthermore, studies that have examined survey sentiment-return relationship for
either emerging or non US developed economies have shown that aggregate market, value
and growth stocks are significantly affected by domestic survey sentiment (e.g. Schmeling
(2009), Bathia and Bredin (2013)).
In spite of regional proximity and high trade interdependence with the US, Canadian
and Japanese stock returns (overall, value and growth) are immune to the propagation
of rational and irrational sentiments of the US individual investors; whereas only French
growth stocks are affected by the rational sentiment of the US individual investors. For
instance, the average US imports from and exports to Canada during 2000’s were $279.07
billion and $228.06 billion respectively, whilst that of France was $36.59 billion and $24.78
billion respectively (see table 9). As previous studies, including Dornbusch et al. (2000),
highlight trade links, regional patterns, and macro-similarities as being major determinants
of stock market co-movements, it is therefore surprising to note that both Canadian and
31As noted before, the GIRF plots for pre-crisis and crisis period are not reported here for brevity sake.
They are available from the authors upon request.
32As per the BG test, we include 7 lags for pre-crisis period and 1 lag for crisis period so as to remove
autocorrelation from residuals. The UMCC index for both pre-crisis and crisis period is then decomposed
into rational and irrational component.
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Japanese stocks are immune to shocks from the US individual investor sentiment.33 Our
findings, therefore, question the significance of direct measures of investor sentiment, in-
dividual surveys, in global markets. Previous studies, including Brown and Cliff (2004),
have noted the significant role of the US individual survey sentiment in affecting US stock
returns.
5.3 Does US sentiment spillover?
There is significant evidence to indicate that US sentiment plays a role in affecting stock
returns of non US G7 countries. From the above findings, we note that the BW composite
sentiment index relative to the UMCC index often play a significant role in affecting stock
returns of non US G7 economies. As noted before, the BW composite sentiment index, an
indirect measure of investor sentiment, is constructed from six sentiment proxies. These
sentiment proxies are often referred to, by stock market commentators as ‘market weather
vanes’ (e.g. Brown and Cliff (2004)). As the BW composite sentiment index indirectly
reflects collective behaviour of the US stock market investors, they’d certainly display
more ability in affecting international stock returns. On the other hand, the UMCC index,
a direct measure of investor sentiment, is constructed from monthly survey responses of
at least 500 consumers. Understandably, this index would therefore have at least lower
predictive ability in affecting international stock returns relative to the BW composite
sentiment index.
Our study includes G7 countries that have developed economies, with financial markets
that are considered to be highly regulated and institutionalised. It is for this reason we
find that the magnitude and timing of shocks is consistent across these countries. As noted
before, the US plays a dominant role in affecting world equity markets. Furthermore, the
degree of trade integration that non US G7 economies enjoys with the US is considerably
significant. And therefore, it is anticipated that US sentiment would be propagated abroad,
and this would be reflected in asset prices of non US G7 countries. Our results, furthermore,
affirm the findings of the previous studies on the US that have shown the role US plays
in global market (e.g. Masih and Masih (2001), Becker et. al. (1995)). For instance,
Masih and Masih (2001), in their study of dynamic causal linkages amongst international
stock markets, find significant interdependencies between the established OECD and the
emerging Asian Markets. They highlight that the US and the UK display leadership in both
the short run and the long run. Becker et al. (1995) argue that the international equity
market linkages are attributable to the reactions of foreign traders to public information
originating from the US.
33As noted before, French growth stocks are affected by rational sentiments of the US individual investors
due to financial crisis of 2007.
18
Finally, we note that the BW composite sentiment index (market sentiment) is more
useful in predicting international aggregate market and growth stock returns. Furthermore,
both rational and irrational component of the US individual investor sentiment do not play
any role in forecasting stock returns of non US G7 countries.
5.4 Sentiment-sector analysis
We now extend our analysis to sector returns. Rather than concentrating on all countries
we restrict our analysis to Canada, UK, and Japan (G3, henceforth) for the 1991-2013
period.34 We focus on the following eight sectors: energy, financial services, healthcare,
industrials, information technology (IT), telecommunication and utilities. The data on
sector returns are sourced from Thomson Eikon.
The IRFs are presented in figures 3 to 11. Our results are generally consistent with
previous findings. Both rational and irrational sentiment of US individual investors has no
effect on any sector returns for the G3. We also observe that the BW composite sentiment
index affects only IT and telecommunication stocks for the G3. It is not unreasonable to
expect that growth stocks would be well represented in both the IT and telecommunications
sectors. We interpret the above results to be broadly in line with our earlier finding that
growth stocks are the main target of US investor sentiment. Furthermore, the BW com-
posite sentiment index affects all sectors of Japan (except energy and utilities). We are not
surprised by this finding given that Japan has the second highest trade-interdependence
with the US (next to Canada). Our results affirm the findings of previous studies (e.g.
Campbell and Hamao (1992)) who find that US and Japanese market are substantially
integrated. They also find that the US variables are indeed helpful in forecasting Japanese
stock returns and not vice-versa. Furthermore, our results also consistent with the findings
of Forbes and Rigobon (2002).35
However, the BW composite sentiment index fails to display its significance level when it
comes to Canadian and UK sectors (except IT and telecommunication stocks). This finding
is surprising given that both Canada and UK enjoy significant trade relationship with the
US since 1991. This finding could be explained by following two reason: First, there has
been substantial decline in the degree of trade integration between US and Canada and US
and UK over the last two decades (see table 8). This decline is in double digit (-19.45%
for UK and -14.91% for Canada). Second, it could be due to the difference in distribution
of value and growth stocks across these eight sectors.
34Canada, UK, and Japan represent markets that have highly integrated capital markets with the US
(Kasa (1992)) and there is considerable trade links (see table 6 and 9).
35Forbes and Rigobon (2002) note that the high levels of co-movement across stock markets, especially
during turbulent times, reflects a continuation of strong cross-market linkages, and not a significant shift
in these linkages.
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Furthermore, our findings on sentiment-sector analysis differ from our earlier finding of
this study where we noted the significance of the BW composite sentiment index in affecting
non-US G7 aggregate market, value and growth stock returns. Given this observation, we
therefore note that the BW composite sentiment index is useful to investors who follow
value-growth investing strategy rather than sector level investing strategy.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we determine the extent of spillover effects of the US individual investor
sentiment, measured by the UMCC index as well as market sentiment, measured by BW
composite sentiment index on value and growth stock returns of G6 countries. We find
significant presence of the propagation of the US sentiment on aggregate market, value
and growth stock returns of G6 countries. Particularly, we observe that aggregate market
and growth stocks of all G6 countries are significantly affected by the spillovers from the
US market sentiment. Furthermore, we find that value stocks become main victim from
sentiment spillovers due to financial crisis. The rational component of the US individual
investor sentiment do not play any role in affecting stock returns of all G6 countries (except
for French growth stocks, which is mainly driven by financial crisis); whereas in line with
previous studies, irrational component of the US individual investor sentiment do not play
any role in affecting stock returns of G6 countries. Furthermore, we find that aggregate,
value and growth stocks of Canada and Japan are immune to the propagation of both
rational and irrational component of the US individual investor sentiment in spite of high
trade interdependence.
Our findings indicate that investor sentiment, which is mainly construed as irrational
by previous studies failed to reflect its significance in affecting international stock returns.
This consistency is also observed for rational sentiment as they do not display any pre-
dictive ability in forecasting international stock returns. And, therefore, we note that the
direct measure of investor sentiment, i.e. investor survey, has no explanatory power across
US borders. Its significance is limited within the US market (e.g. Baker and Wurgler
(2006)). However, the indirect measure of investor sentiment, measured by the BW com-
posite sentiment index, continue to play a significant role in affecting G6 stock returns. This
suggests that collective shocks from investors action as reflected by financial (behavioural)
variables within sentiment index play a greater predictive power in affecting stock returns
than sentiments of individual investors.
As previous studies have shown the presence of casual linkages between developed finan-
cial markets (Masih and Masih (2001)), our study extends the analysis of the US investor
sentiment to an international perspective, further reflecting implications of our results to
a number of practical investment implications. For instance, investors could easily ignore
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the role of rational and irrational component of individual investor sentiment while de-
vising their global investment strategies. Furthermore, since predictive ability of the US
investor sentiment in affecting domestic returns have already been noted by previous stud-
ies (Fisher and Statman (2000, 2003)), and now the propagation of US investor sentiment
in affecting international stock returns have been observed, we, therefore, note that US
investor sentiment could play a role of a ‘global risk’ factor. And therefore one could con-
sider incorporating investor sentiment in international asset pricing models to determine
its significance in capturing asset pricing anomalies.
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Table 1: G7 countries share of World GDP from 1991 to 2013
US CN UK FR GR IT JP
1990’s 27.92 2.21 4.38 4.97 7.52 4.14 15.48
2000’s 26.52 2.44 4.36 4.31 5.67 3.52 9.33
Change -5.03 10.66 -0.51 -13.27 -24.63 -14.97 -39.74
Pre-crisis 28.71 2.28 4.58 4.80 6.97 4.01 13.76
Crisis 23.51 2.49 3.88 4.13 5.34 3.29 7.99
Change -18.12 9.44 -15.31 -13.92 -23.39 -17.97 -41.95
Table 1 reports G7 countries share of world GDP for the period January 1991 to December 2013. The
above figures are in percentage, and it represents average for 1990’s (1991 to 2000), 2000’s (2001 to 2013),
pre-crisis period (1991 to 2006) and crisis period (2007 to 2013).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean (%) Std Dev (%) Max (%) Min (%) ADF t-stat
∆ Inflation 0.20 0.33 1.22 -1.92 -10.22
∆ Industrial production 0.21 2.00 5.57 -4.87 -27.44
1 month T-bill 0.25 0.17 0.56 0.00 -22.85
Economic risk premia 2.72 1.89 5.7 0.01 -11.16
Term spread 1.93 1.15 3.76 -0.53 -12.20
Default spread 0.96 0.42 3.38 0.55 -10.13
Dividend yield 19.22 6.08 34.99 12.11 -2.83
∆ USD 0.14 1.25 6.64 -3.26 -10.89
MRP 0.68 4.36 11.34 -17.23 -15.20
SMB 0.28 3.34 22.02 -16.39 -17.58
HML 0.30 3.20 13.87 -12.68 -14.31
UMD 0.52 5.05 18.39 -34.72 -15.28
UMCC index 86.30 13.16 112.00 55.30 -2.86
BW sentiment index 0.09 0.54 2.50 -0.90 -2.66
Canada (M) 0.96 5.55 22.02 -26.73 -15.02
Canada (V) 1.06 6.31 23.36 -26.30 -15.27
Canada (G) 0.77 6.60 20.26 -29.13 -14.79
UK (M) 0.82 4.71 14.12 -19.91 -14.96
UK (V) 0.92 5.99 28.03 -27.05 -14.05
UK (G) 0.84 4.39 13.31 -18.44 -14.91
France (M) 0.93 5.83 15.04 -21.90 -15.28
France (V) 1.12 7.52 28.01 -30.92 -14.08
France (G) 0.89 5.80 16.37 -22.49 -15.49
Germany (M) 0.91 6.15 21.99 -23.30 -16.11
Germany (V) 1.39 7.12 25.35 -26.86 -16.71
Germany (G) 0.69 6.54 20.28 -26.79 -16.21
Italy (M) 0.72 7.23 21.22 -23.72 -16.89
Italy (V) 0.68 9.02 31.06 -26.75 -16.22
Italy (G) 0.75 6.93 22.92 -25.53 -17.16
Japan (M) 0.32 5.74 17.93 -15.88 -14.37
Japan (V) 1.00 7.02 34.78 -15.96 -15.05
Japan (G) -0.00 5.93 23.39 -17.43 -14.68
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics. The variables are monthly change in consumer price index (∆ Inflation), monthly
change in industrial production index (∆ Industrial Production), 1 month Treasury bill, Economic risk premia (the difference
in monthly yield of 1 month and 3 month T-bill), Term spread (difference in yield of 10 year Treasury Bond and 3 month
T-Bill), Default spread (difference in yield between Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bonds), Dividend yield, monthly
change in 26 country trade-weighted US dollar index (∆ USD), market risk premium (MRP), premium on portfolio of small
stocks relative to large stocks (SMB), premium on portfolio of high book/market stocks relative to low book/market stocks
(HML), momentum factor (UMD), the University of Michigan consumer confidence index (UMCC index) and Baker and
Wurgler (2006) composite sentiment index (BW sentiment index). ‘M, ‘V’ and ‘G’ denotes aggregate market, value stock
and growth stock returns of Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. Std Dev, Min and Max denotes standard
deviation, minimum value and maximum value of each variables respectively. ‘ADF t-stat’ is augmented Dickey-Fuller
t-statistic that has critical values of -3.464, -2.881 and -2.571 at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
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Table 3: Cross-Correlations of Variables representing fundamentals
Inf IP TBill ERP TSpr DSpr Div USD MRP SMB HML UMD
Inf 1.00
IP 0.11 1.00
TBill 0.11 0.03 1.00
ERP 0.12 0.05 0.49 1.00
TSpr -0.05 0.00 -0.63 -0.61 1.00
DSpr -0.23 -0.16 -0.50 -0.52 0.27 1.00
Div -0.09 -0.07 -0.59 -0.61 -0.08 0.45 1.00
∆ USD -0.20 0.08 0.14 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 1.00
MRP 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.28 1.00
SMB 0.02 0.09 -0.08 -0.07 0.11 0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.24 1.00
HML 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.11 -0.06 0.03 -0.24 -0.34 1.00
UMD 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.11 -0.04 -0.22 -0.07 0.15 -0.25 0.07 -0.14 1.00
Table 3 reports cross correlations amongst different macro-economic variables that is considered in decomposing
individual investor sentiment into individual rational sentiment and individual irrational sentiment. The vari-
ables are monthly change in consumer price index (Inf), monthly change in industrial production index (IP),
1 month Treasury Bill (TBill), Economic risk premia (ERP), Term spread (TSpr), Default spread (Dspread),
Dividend yield (Div), monthly change in 26 country trade-weighted US dollar index (∆ USD), market risk
premium (MRP), premium on portfolio of small stocks relative to large stocks (SMB), premium on portfolio of
high book/market stocks relative to low book/market stocks (HML) and momentum factor (UMD).
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Table 4: Effects of Fundamentals on Individual Investor Sentiment measured
by UMCC Index
Dependent variable: UMCC index
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2
Coeff p-values Coeff p-values
Inf -0.66 0.84 -4.36 (0.00)***
IP 0.48 0.35 -0.13 0.49
TBill 57.20 (0.05)** 3.82 0.71
ERP 22.41 (0.00)*** 8.56 (0.00)***
TSpr 4.13 0.41 1.34 0.43
DSpr 7.05 0.50 -7.87 (0.03)**
Div -1.58 (0.00)*** -0.12 0.11
∆ USD -0.93 0.32 0.35 0.27
MRP 0.22 0.40 0.13 0.16
SMB -0.18 0.59 0.39 (0.00)***
HML 0.44 0.21 0.35 (0.01)***
UMD 0.41 (0.06)* -0.15 (0.04)**
Adj R2 (%) 28.61 92.54
Table 4 reports regression of individual investor sentiment, measured by the University of Michigan con-
sumer confidence index (UMCC index) on different macro-economic variables. The variables are monthly
change in consumer price index (Inf), monthly change in industrial production index (IP), 1 month Trea-
sury Bill (TBill), Economic risk premia (ERP), Term spread (TSpr), Default spread (Dspread), Dividend
yield (Div), monthly change in 26 country trade-weighted US dollar index (∆ USD), market risk premium
(MRP), premium on portfolio of small stocks relative to large stocks (SMB), premium on portfolio of
high book/market stocks relative to low book/market stocks (HML) and momentum factor (UMD). The
coefficients and p-values of regression 1 represents all values before inclusion of the AR term and coeffi-
cient and p-values of regression 2 represents all values after inclusion of the AR term. The coefficients of
lags are not presented here for the sake of brevity.
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Table 5: AIC and BIC values at different lags
Lags Aggregate market returns Value stock retunrs Growth stock returns
AIC SBIC AIC BIC AIC SBIC
1 -21.75* -20.79* -18.13* -17.21* -19.97* -19.05*
2 -21.71 -20.28 -18.11 -16.66 -19.91 -18.43
3 -21.60 -19.57 -18.01 -15.98 -19.76 -17.74
4 -21.48 -18.90 -17.87 -15.29 -19.61 -17.02
5 -21.33 -18.19 -17.79 -14.65 -19.42 -16.28
6 -21.20 -17.51 -17.68 -13.99 -19.29 -15.60
Table 5 reports Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian information criterion
(SBIC) values at different lags for estimating two VAR models of nine variables each. The first
model includes value stock returns of G6 countries besides 3 sentiment measures (individual rational
sentiment, individual irrational sentiment and BW composite sentiment index). And second model
includes growth stock returns of G6 countries besides the above three sentiment measures.
Table 6: Non US G7 trade shares with the US over last 23 years (1991 to 2013)
CN UK FR GR IT JP
1990’s 46.88 5.69 3.38 3.93 3.21 13.59
2000’s 39.83 3.70 2.95 3.44 2.82 8.69
Change -15.04 -35.00 -12.80 -12.53 -12.09 -36.01
Pre-crisis 45.47 5.11 3.38 3.92 3.17 12.46
Crisis 37.00 3.33 2.59 3.05 2.59 7.08
Change -18.63 -34.68 -23.40 -22.15 -18.47 -43.22
Table 6 reports non US G7 trade shares with the US for the period January 1991 to December 2013.
Trade shares with the US indicates the ratio of the sum of exports to and imports from the US to the
sum of export to and import from all of the world in each country. The above figures are in percentage,
and it represents average for 1990’s (1991 to 2000), 2000’s (2001 to 2013), pre-crisis period (1991 to 2006)
and crisis period (2007 to 2013).
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Table 7: Non US G7 trade activity relative to nominal GDP (total trade with
other countries excluding US) from 1991 to 2013
CN UK FR GR IT JP
1990’s 49.41 78.81 71.20 71.87 67.10 25.36
2000’s 59.47 110.95 91.07 120.42 82.75 43.34
Change 20.36 40.78 27.91 67.56 23.34 70.90
Pre-crisis 53.29 86.69 75.63 85.10 71.59 29.62
Crisis 59.22 120.47 97.99 131.79 85.91 49.00
Change 11.11 38.96 29.57 54.87 20.01 65.42
Table 7 reports non US G7 trade activity with all of the world relative to nominal GDP for the period
January 1991 to December 2013. Trade activity relative to nominal GDP indivates the ratio of the sum
of import to and export from to nominal GDP for each country. The above figures are in percentage, and
it represents average for 1990’s (1991 to 2000), 2000’s (2001 to 2013), pre-crisis period (1991 to 2006)
and crisis period (2007 to 2013).
Table 8: Trade Integration of non US G7 countries with the US from 1991 to
2013
CN UK FR GR IT JP
1990’s 20.62 2.48 1.13 1.11 0.75 1.31
2000’s 17.69 1.99 1.10 1.36 0.71 1.23
Change -14.19 -19.45 -2.60 23.39 -5.06 -5.69
Pre-crisis 20.21 2.28 1.13 1.18 0.74 1.29
Crisis 16.10 2.03 1.06 1.40 0.70 1.21
Change -20.35 -10.72 -6.02 18.49 -4.74 -6.17
Table 8 reports degree of trade integration of non US G7 countries with the US for the period January
1991 to December 2013. Degree of trade integration is defined as total imports from the US for each of
the above country relative to its respective nominal GDP. The above figures are in percentage, and it
represents average for 1990’s (1991 to 2000), 2000’s (2001 to 2013), pre-crisis period (1991 to 2006) and
crisis period (2007 to 2013).
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Table 9: US imports from and exports to non US G7 countries from 1991 to
2013 (in $ billion)
CN UK FR GR IT JP
Year Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp
Avg 1990’s 149.96 130.60 29.13 31.35 19.61 15.85 39.78 23.40 17.45 8.77 117.48 57.50
Avg 2000’s 279.07 228.06 49.79 44.88 36.59 24.78 85.26 41.00 30.84 13.08 130.53 58.95
Change (%) 86.10 74.63 70.94 43.16 86.56 56.40 114.36 75.24 76.67 49.05 11.10 2.51
Pre-crisis 187.23 152.04 35.44 33.82 24.15 17.57 52.41 26.64 21.23 9.56 122.30 56.42
Crisis 304.54 262.59 53.08 50.82 40.76 28.51 95.38 48.68 33.67 14.96 130.71 62.67
Change (%) 62.65 72.71 49.79 50.29 68.74 62.28 81.99 82.76 58.57 56.40 6.87 11.09
Table 9 reports average trading data [imports (imp) and exports (exp)] of the US with non US G7 countries,
viz. Canada (CN), United Kingdom (UK), France (FR), Germany (GR), Italy (IT) and Japan (JP) for
the period 1991 to 2013. The above figures are in billions of dollars, except for ‘change’ which is given
in percentage. The above figures represents average for 1990’s (1991 to 2000), 2000’s (2001 to 2013), pre-
crisis period (1991 to 2006) and crisis period (2007 to 2013). Data is sourced from the US Department of
Commerce, US Census Bureau.
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Figure 1: Degree of trade integration for the period January 1991 to December 2013
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Figure 1 reports degree of trade integration for the period January 1991 to December 2013. Degree of
trade integration is defined as the world import volume relative to world GDP. The data are sourced
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO).
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Figure 2: US share of the world GDP
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Figure 2 reports the US share of world GDP for the period January 1991 to December 2013. The data
are sourced from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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Figure 3: Response of Canada (CN), United Kingdon (UK) and Japan (JP) energy (left),
financial (centre) and healthcare (right) sector returns to Baker and Wurgler, (BW), (2006)
composite sentiment index
Figure 3a: Canada
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Figure 3b: UK
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Figure 3c: Japan
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Note: The dashed line on each graph represent the upper and lower 95% confidence bands. The response is considered
to be statistically significant when the upper and lower bounds carry the same sign. The “percentage returns” on each graph
is on the vertical axis and “time horizon” is on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 4: Response of Canada (CN), United Kingdon (UK) and Japan (JP) industrials
(left), information technology (centre) and basic materials (right) sector returns to Baker
and Wurgler, (BW), (2006) composite sentiment index
Figure 4a: Canada
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Figure 4b: UK
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Figure 4c: Japan
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Note: The dashed line on each graph represent the upper and lower 95% confidence bands. The response is considered
to be statistically significant when the upper and lower bounds carry the same sign. The “percentage returns” on each graph
is on the vertical axis and “time horizon” is on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 5: Response of Canada (CN), United Kingdon (UK) and Japan (JP) telecommunica-
tion (left) and utilities (right) sector returns to Baker and Wurgler, (BW), (2006) composite
sentiment index
Figure 5a: Canada
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Figure 5b: UK
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Figure 5c: Japan
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Note: The dashed line on each graph represent the upper and lower 95% confidence bands. The response is considered to be
statistically significant when the upper and lower bounds carry the same sign. The “percentage returns” on each graph is on
the vertical axis and “time horizon” is on the horizontal axis.
39
Figure 6: Response of Canada (CN), United Kingdon (UK) and Japan (JP) energy (left),
financial (centre) and healthcare (right) sector returns to rational sentiments of the US
individual investors
Figure 6a: Canada
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Figure 6b: UK
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Figure 6c: Japan
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Note: The dashed line on each graph represent the upper and lower 95% confidence bands. The response is considered
to be statistically significant when the upper and lower bounds carry the same sign. The “percentage returns” on each graph
is on the vertical axis and “time horizon” is on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 7: Response of Canada (CN), United Kingdon (UK) and Japan (JP) industrials
(left), information technology (centre) and basic materials (right) sector returns to rational
sentiments of the US individual investors
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Figure 7b: UK
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Response of the UK basic materials sector to rational sentiments of the US individual investors
Figure 7c: Japan
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Note: The dashed line on each graph represent the upper and lower 95% confidence bands. The response is considered
to be statistically significant when the upper and lower bounds carry the same sign. The “percentage returns” on each graph
is on the vertical axis and “time horizon” is on the horizontal axis.
41
Figure 8: Response of Canada (CN), United Kingdon (UK) and Japan (JP) telecommuni-
cation (left) and utilities (right) sector returns to rational sentiments of the US individual
investors
Figure 8a: Canada
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Response of CN telecommunication sector to rational sentiments of the US individual investors
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Response of CN utlities sector to rational sentiments of the US individual investors
Figure 8b: UK
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Figure 8c: Japan
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Note: The dashed line on each graph represent the upper and lower 95% confidence bands. The response is considered to be
statistically significant when the upper and lower bounds carry the same sign. The “percentage returns” on each graph is on
the vertical axis and “time horizon” is on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 9: Response of Canada (CN), United Kingdon (UK) and Japan (JP) energy (left),
financial (centre) and healthcare (right) sector returns to irrational sentiments of the US
individual investors
Figure 9a: Canada
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Response of CN healthcare sector to irrational sentiments of the US individual investors
Figure 9b: UK
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Figure 9c: Japan
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Note: The dashed line on each graph represent the upper and lower 95% confidence bands. The response is considered
to be statistically significant when the upper and lower bounds carry the same sign. The “percentage returns” on each graph
is on the vertical axis and “time horizon” is on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 10: Response of Canada (CN), United Kingdon (UK) and Japan (JP) industrials
(left), information technology (centre) and basic materials (right) sector returns to irrational
sentiments of the US individual investors
Figure 10a: Canada
−.2
−.15
−.1
−.05
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
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Response of CN basic materials sector to irrational sentiments of the US individual investors
Figure 10b: UK
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Response of the UK basic materials sector to irrational sentiments of the US individual investors
Figure 10c: Japan
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Note: The dashed line on each graph represent the upper and lower 95% confidence bands. The response is considered
to be statistically significant when the upper and lower bounds carry the same sign. The “percentage returns” on each graph
is on the vertical axis and “time horizon” is on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 11: Response of Canada (CN), United Kingdon (UK) and Japan (JP) telecommuni-
cation (left) and utilities (right) sector returns to irrational sentiments of the US individual
investors
Figure 11a: Canada
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Response of CN telecommunication sector to irrational sentiments of the US individual investors
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Figure 11b: UK
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Response of the UK telecommunication sector to irrational sentiments of the US individual investors
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Figure 11c: Japan
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Response of JP telecommunication sector to irrational sentiments of the US individual investors
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Note: The dashed line on each graph represent the upper and lower 95% confidence bands. The response is considered to be
statistically significant when the upper and lower bounds carry the same sign. The “percentage returns” on each graph is on
the vertical axis and “time horizon” is on the horizontal axis.
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